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Abstract
Two markedly different concepts of heritability co-exist in the social and life
sciences. Behavioral genetics has popularized a highly technical,
quantitative concept: heritability as the proportion of genetic variance
relative to the total phenotypic variance of a trait in a population. At the
same time, a more common biological notion simply refers to the
transmission of phenotypic traits across generations via the transmission of
genes. It is argued here that the behavioral-genetic concept is of little use
overall, while the common biological concept is overly narrow and implies a
false view of the significance of genes in development. By appropriately
expanding heritability into a general causal concept based on its role in
evolution, we will arrive at a new view of development, heritability, and
evolution that recognizes the importance of non-genetic inheritance and the
causal parity of all determinants of phenotypic traits.
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Introduction
Behavioral genetics shares with many other scientific disciplines 
the goal of learning about the various factors that shape human 
beings and about what such knowledge implies for the possibil-
ity of positive change. However, the particular way in which 
behavioral genetics has traditionally raised and answered those 
questions is the subject of continuing controversy (Barnes 
et al., 2014; Burt & Simons, 2014; Burt & Simons, 2015; 
Moffitt & Beckely, 2015; Wright et al., 2017).
The problems noted by critics are diverse: they range from 
statistical assumptions made in estimating heritability, the 
meaning of those estimates and their relationship to the causes of 
human traits, to the conceptual distinction between nature (genes) 
and nurture (environment) underlying behavioral genetics’ core 
methodology. On a more abstract level, these issues translate 
into doubts about whether the questions asked by behavioral 
geneticists make sense, and, if so, whether the methods used 
to answer them are valid.
This paper has two aims: to diagnose the situation and to offer 
a way out. The diagnosis will involve showing why the concept 
of heritability in behavioral genetics lacks utility. The way out leads 
from recognizing the relationship of heritability in the behavio-
ral genetic sense to its common meaning in biology and then to 
generalizing this biological notion into a principled concept of 
heritability based on its causal role in evolution. In the process, 
a modern view of heritability, development and evolution, united 
by causal principles, will emerge, and will complete the diagno-
sis of why, in our view, the traditional behavioral genetic approach 
has become obsolete.
This paper will focus exclusively on the classical methods of 
behavioral genetics - variance partitioning into a genetic and one 
or two environmental components - and will ignore more mod-
ern approaches involving the actual measurement of specific 
genes or environmental factors (i.e. it focusses on G vs E, and 
ACE models). The reason for this is twofold: first, even though 
some behavioral geneticists may now disavow the classical 
methods, these have produced the main body of literature in the 
field, and understanding the problems with this body is a pre-
requisite to understanding whether or not modern extensions 
of behavioral genetics have successfully overcome the prob-
lems. Second, even if “only” the classic results were shown to be 
invalid, it would force the abandonment of a great many core 
findings about heritability which still inform modern thinking 
about the genetic nature of traits such as intelligence and 
diseases such as schizophrenia.
In what follows, we assume the falsity of genetic determin-
ism. This means we reject the idea that genes have more power 
than other developmental causes to determine the phenotype. 
We thus exclude a spectrum of views, from strong genetic deter-
minism, the claim that genes fully determine a phenotype no 
matter what other developmental causes do, to the so-called 
“information metaphor”, the claim that genes, and only genes, 
carry information in the sense of instructions or a program 
to control development. The information metaphor is the most 
widespread form of genetic determinism today, but it has 
been shown to lack any solid theoretical or empirical basis 
(Godfrey-Smith, 1999; Godfrey-Smith, 2008; Griffiths, 2001; 
Griffiths & Gray, 1994; Johnston, 1987; Keller, 1995; 
Neumann-Held, 2006; Nijhout, 1990; Moss, 2004; Oyama, 1985; 
Sarkar, 1996; Šustar, 2007).
The origins of nature and nurture
Charles Darwin shattered the complacent view of his predeces-
sors that God was taking care of guaranteeing the similarity of 
parents and offspring. After Darwin, the fact of parent-offspring 
resemblance found itself in urgent need of a non-theistic 
explanation. Theories of biological inheritance sprang up, and 
the role of environment and upbringing called for clarification. 
Darwin’s cousin Francis Galton was perhaps the first to explicitly 
bring biology (the innate qualities of a person, which he called 
“nature”) into opposition with the environmental influences that 
impinge on a person after birth (calling the acquired qualities 
“nurture”). As is well known, the biologically inherited part 
later became identified with genes. The view that emerged saw 
human development as the battleground of two fundamental 
forces: genes and environment. The question became: which of 
the two was stronger, and how could their relative strengths be 
measured?
Galton had already suggested that observing identical twins 
would be useful in addressing these questions, as their virtual 
indistinguishability from birth indicated that their biological 
inheritances (genes) were the same. The degree to which they 
turned out different should then be a measure of the influence of 
environment.
By the 1930s, the statistical tools necessary to decompose the 
effects of nature and nurture had become available in the form of 
the analysis of variance. It allowed quantification of how much of 
the variance in an organismic trait was “due to” the variance in 
any number of explanatory variables. For example, the height to 
which a plant would grow was expected to depend both on its 
genotype and on the environment, such as the amount of water in 
the soil. In a simple experimental design, an agriculturist could 
plant seeds of different genotypes and expose each genotype 
to different amounts of water. After the plants had grown to 
their full height, she would measure how much height varied 
among the different genotypes (averaged across all water con-
ditions), obtaining the amount of genetic variance. Similarly, 
she would measure the variation in height across the different 
levels of exposure to water (averaged across all genotypes) and 
obtain the environmental variance. If the effects of genotype 
and water were independent of each other, summing the two 
variances would yield the total variance in height across all the 
plants. The ratio of the genetic variance to the total height vari-
ance (a number between 0 and 1) could be taken as a measure 
of the relative strength of the effect of differences in genes on 
differences in plant height. This number became known as the 
“heritability” of a trait (Lush, 1937). The ratio of environmental 
variance to height variance was the complement of heritability 
and was taken to indicate the strength of environmental 
differences on trait differences. Comparing these two ratios would 
supply the answer to Galton’s question as to which was stronger, 
nature or nurture?
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Variance partitioning in humans
The way to obtain these numbers in humans is, however, impor-
tantly different from that in the example above. The facts that 
monozygotic (“identical”) twins share all of their genes, and 
that dizygotic (“fraternal”) twins share half of their genes can 
be used as a shortcut to estimating genetic and environmental vari-
ances (how this is done mathematically will not concern us here). 
The simplest partitioning only comprises a term for genes (G) 
and one for everything else, called environment (E). The total 
variance in some phenotypic trait (P) is then simply the sum 
of the genetic and environmental variance:
P = G + E
A slightly more complex approach is to split the environmental 
variance in two: one term for environmental influences that make 
twins more similar to each other (called “shared environmental 
effects”) and one for environmental influences that do not make 
twins more similar (called “non-shared environmental effects”). 
This is called the ACE model, where A stands for (additive) 
genetic effects, C for shared and E for non-shared environmental 
effects1. 
What is important to understand is that apart from the trait of inter-
est (e.g. intelligence, antisocial behavior, political preference), 
nothing is measured in a classic behavioral genetic study. The 
subjects’ genotype is not quantified or identified in absolute terms. 
All that enters the calculations is the assumption that all the genetic 
variance of monozygotic (MZ) twins contributes to their pheno-
typic similarity (since they share all of their genes), while only 
half of the genetic variance of dizygotic (DZ) twins contrib-
utes to their phenotypic similarity (since they share only half of 
their genes). Environmental influences are not measured at all. 
Instead, the term for the environment (E) is simply the remain-
der after the phenotypic (P) and genetic (G) variances have been 
calculated (E = P - G).
This has an important corollary: since the environment is treated 
as a leftover category, any environmental differences that 
produce the same pattern of effects as do genetic differences will 
be counted as genetic effects, not environmental ones. This is 
true even if the environmental differences actually cause the 
differences in phenotype.
Perhaps the most striking example of this is the fact that the phe-
notypic effects of the common egg cell that MZ twins develop 
from is entirely neglected in twin study designs. MZ twins are 
created when one single fertilized egg splits in two and the two 
resulting daughter cells each grow to become a separate individ-
ual, while DZ twins stem from two different egg cells fertilized 
by two different sperm cells. Twin studies make use of the fact that 
in MZ twins, the two daughter cells will have the same genome 
- copies of the parent cell’s genome - but ignore that the whole 
non-genetic part of the two cells (called the “cytoplasm”) also 
stems from the common parent cell and will therefore also be 
the same or very similar, whereas the two cells from which DZ 
twins develop are likely to have less similar cytoplasms. The 
implication is that in addition to (and in conjunction with) their 
common DNA, their common cytoplasm will also make MZ 
twins more similar to each other than DZ twins. To the extent 
that this effect operates in the 2:1 fashion specified by the math-
ematical formalism of the ACE model, it is subsumed under the 
genetic component A, while in reality it is a shared environmen-
tal effect belonging to component C. The result is high values 
for A and low values for C, as is repeatedly found in 
behavioral genetics studies.
One context in which this matters is the continued debate 
about the causes of individual or racial IQ differences (see, 
e.g., recent debate in Vox [Haider, 2017a; Haider, 2017b; 
Turkheimer et al., 2017a; Turkheimer et al., 2017b]). If twin- 
based methods of identifying sources of variation confound 
genetic with cytoplasmic effects, the importance of genes for IQ 
will have to be re-evaluated. The same is true in another important 
context: the debate about the relative importance of parents vs. 
peers, where behavioral genetic findings have given rise to dra-
matic claims about the global inefficacy of parenting (Boutwell, 
2015a; Boutwell, 2015b; Boutwell, 2017a; Boutwell, 
2017b; Boutwell & Khan, 2016; Harris, 1998; Rowe, 1994). In 
fact, what makes cytoplasmic confounding particularly nasty is 
that there is no known way of disentangling genetic from cyto-
plasmic effects. The problem affects the entire body of research 
on twins and heritability. Everything, from antisocial personal-
ity to political preferences, that has been claimed to be heritable 
could potentially be an effect of cytoplasmic similarity, or, 
more realistically, a joint effect of genetic and cytoplasmic 
similarity.
The interactionist challenge
A more fundamental charge is sometimes leveled at variance 
partitioning in the context of developmental causes, a charge 
that has been considered by a number of critics to be the fatal flaw 
of behavioral genetics (Burt & Simons, 2014; Burt & Simons, 
2015; Moore, 2003). This “interactionist challenge” states that 
the development of organismic traits is a process of interacting 
causes that are inextricably entangled, such that their individual 
causal contributions cannot be separated, let alone quantified. 
Therefore, attempting to attach numbers to the relative impor-
tance of genes and environment in a trait is doomed to fail. Genes 
and environmental causes are both necessary (and none by 
itself sufficient) to create a phenotype, it is said, and if that is 
the case, it is impossible to quantify their relative contributions. 
Variance partitioning with regard to the causes of development 
is fatally flawed.
For example, in their recent challenge to behavioral genetics, 
Burt and Simons (Burt & Simons, 2015) put the case as follows:
“[G]enes and environments are involved in an 
interpenetrating and interdependent dynamic relationship 
1We will not deal with the assumption of additivity and the concomitant 
ommission of an interaction term (G x E) from the basic variance partitioning 
scheme in classical behavioral genetics. We believe the assumption of additivity 
is a significant flaw that might in itself render heritability estimates useless. 
However, our intention here is to show the problems with heritability estimates, 
even granting the unimportance of G x E interactions.
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that renders the attempt to demarcate separate influences— 
the goal of heritability studies—illogical at both the 
 individual and population levels” (p. 105).
The argument is often illustrated by analogy. One such comes 
from Richard Lewontin (Lewontin, 1974), who has us imagine 
two men building a brick wall, where one is laying the bricks 
and the other is applying the mortar. The two men are analogous 
to two different developmental causes, and the brick wall repre-
sents a phenotypic trait. After their work is done, does it make 
sense to ask which of the two men has contributed more to 
the finished wall? The answer is no, because both their contribu-
tions are necessary, but not by themselves sufficient, to build 
the wall.
Another popular analogy is the area of a rectangle (analogous 
to a trait) and its two causes, length and width. Does it make 
sense to ask which of them, its length or its width, contributes 
more to the rectangle’s area? Obviously not. Both length and 
width are necessary for the area to even exist, so neither can be 
considered more important. Trying to quantify their relative 
contributions makes no sense.
How can behavioral geneticists respond to this challenge? 
First, there is some common ground: the defender of behavioral 
genetics agrees with the critic’s characterization of how causes 
operate in development (Barnes et al., 2014; Rutter, 2006)2. Sec-
ond, however, she correctly notes that this characterization per-
tains to how individual traits arise in an individual organism, 
i.e. to the etiology of traits. It says nothing about what causes 
differences in traits between different individuals. Third, she 
points out that the latter is what behavioral geneticists are inter-
ested in and what they use variance partitioning for. Fourth, she 
claims that variance partitioning is still possible, even in the 
case of inextricably interacting developmental causes.
This last claim is correct. In their behavioral genetics textbook, 
Plomin et al. (2008, p. 85) use the example of the rectangle 
to show that, although both its length and width are neces-
sary for any individual rectangle’s area to exist, a population of 
rectangles may not only show variation in length and width, 
but these two variations may well contribute unequally to the 
variation in area. In other words, in a particular population of 
rectangles, the variation in length might be much greater than 
that in width, and therefore contribute much more to the vari-
ation in surface area. In the context of the causes of differences 
(variation) in a population, length and width are not 
inseparable; either one of them can exhibit larger variation than 
the other one and therefore contribute more to differences in 
the trait of interest, in this case surface area.
Having established the feasibility of variance partitioning for 
interacting causes, the crucial question becomes: can it actually 
tell us anything useful about such causes? Critics of 
behavioral genetics may think not; they may think that variance 
partitioning is irrelevant, or even illogical when it comes to ques-
tions of trait etiology (Burt & Simons, 2014; Burt & Simons, 
2015; Moore, 2003). However, far from being irrelevant, vari-
ance partitioning is actually one of the major scientific tools used 
to identify causes in general, including the causes of organis-
mic traits. It is the core of two of the most widespread statistical 
methods in all of the natural sciences: ANOVA and linear 
regression, both employed nearly universally in experimental 
and observational studies to provide clues as to the causes of 
human and animal traits. Crucially, variance partitioning 
provides these clues not only when causes are operating 
independently, but also in the case of interacting developmen-
tal causes. This is true simply because if something is a cause of 
some outcome, varying its level or its presence will change the 
outcome. Co-variation with an outcome is therefore an indi-
cator of causation. If, for example, some genes are causes of 
a trait, changing or removing those genes will typically change 
the trait. (The ‘typically’ qualifier is necessary because there 
might be other causal mechanisms preventing the co-variation.) 
It does not matter whether a cause interacts with or is independ-
ent of other causes. One can begin to see this by setting up a 
simple statistical simulation that embodies the constraints 
of two interacting causal variables and running a regression anal-
ysis, as has been done by Gamma & Liebrenz (2017). Results 
show positive relationships between the two variables and the 
outcome, correctly identifying them as possible causes.
The upshot is that the interactionist charge that variance 
partitioning is useless in the case of interacting developmen-
tal causes is invalid. Analysis of variance on the population 
level can, in principle, identify the causes of traits in individu-
als, even if these causes are “non-separable” in the sense of being 
jointly necessary, but singly insufficient, to cause a trait. There 
is nothing illogical or categorically wrong about this endeavor. 
Employing variance partitioning per se is not what makes 
heritability estimates useless. They are useless for quite another 
reason.
Heritability in behavioral genetics: relevance to 
causes of traits
It is not uncommon for technical terms used in science to 
have a pre-existing meaning. “Heritability” is an example. Its 
meaning in behavioral genetics is very different from that in 
common language, including its common meaning in biology. 
Behavioral genetic heritability (which we will henceforth call 
“heritabilityBG“) is a single number estimated from twin studies 
that denotes the proportion of total variance in an outcome vari-
able that is genetic variance. In other words, it is simply the ratio 
of genetic to total phenotypic variance. As such, its value lies 
between 0 (no heritabilityBG) and 1 (complete heritabilityBG). 
In the context of variance partitioning as discussed above, 
heritabilityBG is the relative size of the variance component 
due to genes, where “genes” are one of two (or three) causes 
being considered (the other being “environment”).
Before discussing the implications of the different meanings 
of “heritability”, we need to assess the utility or lack thereof 
2From Barnes et al., 2014: ”What this necessarily means is that for a single 
individual, his or her genes and environment in interaction contribute to his or 
her phenotypic score…” (p. 615).
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of heritabilityBG for identifying the developmental causes of 
traits. We have shown that variance partitioning per se can be 
useful for identifying such causes, but that is not at all the same 
as showing that estimating heritabilityBG is useful for this. 
In fact, the very reason why heritabilityBG estimates lack utility 
is because they are a particularly unhelpful way of partitioning 
variance.
The main problem is that the two (or three) sources of variance 
in behavioral genetic studies are such broad, unspecific and 
unsystematic categories as to make it virtually impossible to draw 
any useful causal inferences from them. The ACE model seems 
to make a potentially useful distinction between two kinds of 
environmental effects (shared vs. non-shared), but these effects 
are identified in terms of whether they make twins more similar 
to each other or not. They do not identify any actual environ-
mental conditions3. Even assuming that heritabilityBG precisely 
estimates the proportion of genetic variance, all a non-zero 
value tells us is that genes make a difference to a trait in a popula-
tion. It leaves us entirely in the dark as to which specific genes 
are involved in the formation of that trait (Sober, 2001).
It may be objected that the simple statement that genes 
contribute to a trait (that a trait “is genetic”) already constitutes 
significant knowledge. Thus, the behavioral geneticist Michael 
Rutter (Rutter, 2006) writes
"…the overall pattern demands acceptance of the 
importance of genetic influences. That is, the findings are 
incompatible with a zero genetic effect". (p. 60)
Frankly, however, that genes are involved universally in 
the formation of traits is one of the fundamental facts of devel-
opmental biology. There was never a reason to assume that 
a ubiquitous cellular component whose contributions to most 
aspects of cell life have been extensively documented would 
somehow magically fail to affect some classes of traits. Another 
behavioral geneticist, Eric Turkheimer, calls this a “pointless 
null hypothesis” (Turkheimer, 2011).
Looking at variance partitioning in any field other than behav-
ioral genetics will show how differently it is used. For example, 
a study of obesity may measure intake of fat, carbohydrates and 
proteins and find a statistical effect of carbs. This result gives a 
useful pointer to possible causes, and a follow-up study might 
then look at different types of sugary foods to narrow down the 
causes of the effect. Studies all over the natural sciences use 
experimental manipulations or observational variables specific 
enough to give potentially useful hints for further investiga-
tion. In contrast, knowing that some variance in a trait is genetic, 
even knowing the amount of that variance, provides little 
useful knowledge and little idea how to proceed further.
As far as the identification of causes is concerned, heritabilityBG 
tells us little that is useful. Nevertheless, the brute fact of 
genetic involvement as indicated by a positive heritabilityBG 
estimate might be regarded as carrying further significance: it 
might tell us something about the malleability of a trait.
Heritability in behavioral genetics: relevance to 
malleability
According to a still-common view, genetic involvement means 
that a trait, being inherited and therefore “inborn”, is more 
hard-wired, more fixed, and less amenable to change than a trait 
that is environmentally caused. Therefore, the fact of genetic 
involvement is taken to be much more consequential than, for 
example, the involvement of diet, in causing a trait.
This is not the case, however. Whether genes are or are not 
involved in the causation of a trait says nothing about how diffi-
cult it is to change that trait. In other words, genetically influenced 
traits are not a priori more difficult to change. A given trait’s mal-
leability is always an empirical question, and the answer may 
not only be different for different traits, but even for different 
individuals carrying the same trait.
Perhaps, if a genetically influenced trait could only be altered 
by changing the relevant genes, an argument could be made 
that due to the relative inaccessibility as well as the structural 
and functional complexity of the genome, changing such a trait 
would always be difficult compared to changing other traits 
whose etiology does not involve genes. But changing a genetically 
influenced trait does not necessarily require changing the rel-
evant genes. Traits are always multi-causal, and each of the causes 
involved, whether genetic or environmental, is, in principle, 
an access point for causal manipulation.
A famous example is that of the disease phenylketonuria 
(PKU). It involves a faulty gene that fails to produce an enzyme 
required to break down a certain amino acid. If left untreated, 
the amino acid accumulates in the body, leading to early mental 
retardation. There is a treatment that essentially cures the disease, 
but it has nothing to do with genes. It consists of a special diet 
3The shared environmental effect C is often understood as those influences 
that are shared by twins (notably the family environment, see e.g. Rowe [1994], 
p. 53), whereas the non-shared environmental effect E is taken to be those 
influences and experiences that are unique to each twin (e.g. peers). Behavioral 
genetics studies have repeatedly found that C is small, while E is quite 
substantial. This has been taken to show that the whole family environment - 
including everything that parents do - has very little effect on children’s 
development, while it is those experiences outside the home, e.g. peer 
groups, that mostly shape their personalities (Rowe, 1994; Harris, 1998). If 
this were true, it would have dramatic implications for parents, schools and any 
kind of intervention targeted at improving children’s abilities and behavior.
However, what these variance components really stand for are environmental 
influences that make twins more similar (C) to each other or not (E). Better 
names for these effects would be something like “similar-making” and “not 
similar-making”. Although it may seem self-evident to some that common 
experiences, including much of what happens in the home, will have 
similar effects, making the twins more alike, and that unique experiences (such 
as with peers) will make them different, this is not at all a given (Rutter, 2012). 
While plausible-sounding, it is pure speculation, and as such, nothing that 
could bear the weight of far-reaching conclusions about the effectiveness of 
parenting. Finally, it should be obvious on reflection that without measuring 
anything about the actual environments encountered by the study subjects, 
it is hard to conclude anything about their effects. A mere mathematical 
formalism cannot achieve this.
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that is free of the offending amino acid, so that a toxic build-up 
is prevented. A causally simple environmental intervention pre-
vents all symptoms of a genetic disease. Many other such examples 
could be found, all illustrating the same underlying principle: if 
multiple causes co-determine an outcome, manipulating any of 
them can potentially change the outcome. This is true regardless 
of whether any one of the causes is genetic or not.
It is important to realize that heritabilityBG estimates are not 
informative about contexts such as this, in which a treatment for 
a disease trait, or an intervention to improve a beneficial trait 
(e.g. intelligence) is sought. In particular, the question of whether 
there could be an environmental intervention to change the 
trait in a desired direction is not addressed by heritabilityBG, 
since such an as-yet-unknown intervention cannot be part of the 
environment of the population from which the heritabilityBG 
estimate was derived. For example, before a dietary treatment 
became available, the heritabilityBG of PKU was high, as envi-
ronmental variation in the disease phenotype was low. This 
meant nothing, however, about the prospects of finding a 
successful environmental intervention.
HeritabilityBG does not indicate a trait’s malleability. Genetic 
involvement per se does not determine malleability, and 
even the fact that a trait such as PKU is “genetic”, i.e. originates 
from a gene defect, does not allow any a priori conclusions 
about how difficult it is to change, and where best to intervene 
to change it.
Heritability in behavioral genetics: relevance to 
biological heritability
In biology, heritability is most commonly understood as 
a trait’s potential to recur across generations due to genetic 
inheritance. We will henceforth call this notion “heritabilityBio“. 
To say that a trait is heritableBio means that if it exists in parents, 
it can recur in offspring because they receive from their par-
ents the genes that give rise to the trait. HeritabilityBio therefore 
incorporates not only the aspect of “passing on” something 
to someone, but also a particular causal mechanism for doing 
so. That mechanism is genetic inheritance, because in the 
standard view of biology, genes are seen as the only causal 
substrate for trait inheritance. In “The Selfish Gene”, Richard 
Dawkins puts this bluntly by stating that “genetic factors 
replicate themselves, blemishes and all, but non-genetic factors 
do not” (Dawkins, 1976, pp. 98/99).
What is the relationship between heritabilityBG and 
heritabilityBio? Why do behavioral geneticists call a statistical 
measure of the proportion of genetic variance in a trait 
“heritability”?
The answer is that, given the view that heritabilityBio is based 
exclusively on the transmission of genes, measuring the 
influence of genetic differences on trait differences in a popu-
lation would simultaneously capture the extent to which such 
trait differences are biologically inherited. While superficially 
plausible, it is clear that the procedure by which heritabilityBG 
is estimated does not directly probe any aspect of the proc-
ess of genetic transmission from parents to offspring. It is not 
surprising, then, that the behavioral genetic measure of 
heritability sometimes diverges sharply from the biological 
concept.
For example, consider traits such as bipedality (having two 
legs) or pentadactyly (having five fingers) in humans. These 
are paradigmatic features of the “design” of Homo sapiens 
and universally considered to be highly heritable. However, 
almost all variation in these traits is environmental, stemming 
from accidents, and therefore heritabilityBG is basically zero.
The inverse case is possible, too: consider the trait of wearing 
skirts, which, as most would agree, is primarily culturally deter-
mined and not heritableBio. Wearing skirts, however, is almost 
perfectly correlated with sex, which itself is usually considered 
genetically determined. Giving precedence to genetic over 
environmental variation, even when the two correlate, the 
heritabilityBG of wearing skirts would turn out to be very high. 
Analogous considerations would show that racism and sexism 
are also highly heritable, even if in reality they were entirely 
sociocultural phenomena.
How do these discrepancies occur? In the case of bipedality, 
what goes wrong is that there is genetic causation, but no genetic 
variation. And without genetic variation, heritabilityBG is zero. 
In the other cases, there is environmental causation and 
therefore correlation, but it is congruent with a genetic 
correlation, so the effect is ascribed to genes and heritabilityBG is 
high.
These examples illustrate that behavioral genetic heritability 
does not track biological heritability as commonly understood.
To summarize the previous three sections, heritabilityBG is 
of little use in determining the specific causes of a trait, in 
indicating the malleability of a trait, and in tracking heritability 
as commonly understood in biology.
Truth is not decided by authority, but it should at least be 
known that authorities in (the philosophy of) biology share this 
verdict (Bateson, 2001; Feldman & Lewontin, 1975; Keller, 
2010; Lewontin, 2006; Sober, 2001), even if they are perhaps 
more diplomatic about it than we are here. We specifically men-
tion these scholars because it is philosophers of biology who have 
done most of the work in developing the conceptual basis of 
biology, particularly addressing issues such as the role of genes 
in evolution and development (see for example the collection of 
essays in Neumann-Held & Rehmann-Sutter, 2006). But promi-
nent behavioral geneticists also acknowledge that estimating 
heritabilityBG in itself is not very useful. According to Michael 
Rutter (Rutter, 2006), “It is not that, on its own, it matters very 
much whether the heritability is 20 percent or 80 percent” (p. 89), 
while Eric Turkheimer finds variance partitioning as practiced 
by behavioral genetics to be without “scientific content” entirely 
(Turkheimer, 2011, p. 598).
Extending standard biological heritability
Unfortunately, it turns out that the common biological 
concept of heritability (heritabilityBio) is itself seriously want-
ing. By fixing it, however, we can arrive at an elegant, unified 
view of evolution based on a principled definition of 
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heritability. This definition will abstract from contingent, par-
ticular mechanisms of inheritance and instead focus on the 
causal role of heritability in Darwinian evolution. It will be 
called heritabilityX (the “X” stands for “extended”).
Why was Darwin able to formulate his theory of evolution 
by natural selection without knowing anything about the actual 
mechanisms of biological inheritance? Because the actual 
mechanisms do not matter for the theory, only the fact of herit-
ability itself, understood as the fact that parental traits tend to 
recur in the offspring generation or, simply put, that offspring 
tend to resemble their parents.
This basic observation is one part of the “holy trinity” of 
Darwinism, the three criteria that enable evolution by natural 
selection: phenotypic variation, differential fitness, and 
heritability (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999, p. 32). Together they 
specify a causal recipe for evolution by natural selection. 
Importantly, this recipe is abstract enough to leave its physi-
cal implementation open. It is defined, rather, by the causal roles 
it specifies. As long as these roles are implemented in any 
way in any system, the system will exhibit Darwinian evolution.
In the world of organisms, the recipe specifies that there 
must be variation in a trait among a population of individuals. 
Some of the variants cause their carriers to have higher fitness, 
i.e. to produce more offspring than carriers of other variants. 
Finally, the trait in question must be heritable, i.e. offspring 
of carriers of the “successful” trait must be more likely to have 
the trait themselves. As a result, the trait increases in frequency 
in the offspring generation.
This three-step process is one iteration of the cycle of 
Darwinian evolution, and it will repeat as long as there is a fit-
ness differential and no countervailing forces. The successful 
trait will continue to increase in the population across many 
generations, which is another way of saying that it evolves by 
natural selection.
The causal role of heritability in Darwinian evolution
Nothing in this account depends on the particularities of the 
mechanism by which offspring come to be similar to parents. 
Rather, the heritability requirement is defined by a particular 
causal role. This role consists of causing parental traits to recur 
in offspring. This can happen in potentially many ways, but, fol-
lowing Oyama (1985), we suggest that these ways can be sub-
sumed under three broad categories, using one simple background 
assumption.
The assumption is that, since traits are multiply caused, the 
presence of the same or similar causes (in different organisms 
of the same population) will tend to result in the same or similar 
traits. Put somewhat informally, the idea is simply “same input - 
same output”. This is certainly plausible.
A parental trait will therefore recur in offspring to the extent 
that the same causes that gave rise to the trait in parents are also 
present in offspring. For a trait to be inherited, therefore, the 
same or very similar “trait-forming” causes need to be present 
in both parents and offspring. Oyama (1985) identifies three 
broad ways in which this can happen: first, the trait-forming 
causes simply persist across generations; second, the trait-forming 
causes are physically copied and transported from parents to 
offspring; and, third, the trait-forming causes are reconstructed 
in each generation anew. These categories should cover most, 
if not all, of the possibilities of trait inheritance.
To make the idea more concrete, we will give examples of 
each category. Persistent trait-forming causes include fixed 
features of the environment such as sunlight, oxygen, gravity, 
and humidity. These are always there, and will exert their effect 
in every generation. Copied trait-forming causes include the 
familiar case of DNA, which is physically replicated before being 
passed on to offspring. DNA methylation patterns, if reliably 
copied across generations, are another example. Reconstructed 
trait-forming causes are probably the major category. They include 
all trait-forming causes that recur in every generation without 
having been directly physically copied or having been always 
there. Examples are diverse and include the womb (present in 
every generation, but reconstructed anew from “parts” in every 
generation), nutrition, social interaction with parents and 
conspecifics, behavioral habits, cultural norms and practices, and 
language.
As these examples show, heritability in the evolutionarily rel-
evant sense is more accurately described as “repeated presence 
across generations”, because this removes the narrow focus 
on something physical having to be passed on from parents to 
offspring. Here, however, we will stick to the shorter term 
“heritabilityX”.
Non-genetic inheritance in nature
At this point, it is natural to ask what the empirical evidence 
for non-genetic inheritance in humans is. The answer is that 
it is all around. This is less a case of having to discover novel 
non-genetic inheritance mechanisms (although that is part of 
it, as for example with epigenetic inheritance), but one of many 
basic and well-known observations that fall into place as soon 
as they are put in a new conceptual framework. That oxygen and 
sunlight are reliably present in every generation of our species is 
a simple fact. That every child starts out from a cell contain-
ing its mother’s cytoplasm and begins growing in the rich 
environment of a womb is another one. That diets can remain 
stable for long periods of time in local populations is also 
well-known. That offspring in each generation experience very 
similar maternal behavior, soak up local cultural norms and 
practices and learn the local language is no secret, either.
Vastly more than just DNA is stable across generations 
(Griffiths & Gray, 2001; Griffiths & Gray, 1994; Jablonka & 
Lamb, 2005; Jablonka & Lamb, 2007; Jablonka & Raz, 2009; 
Oyama, 1985). This should be uncontroversial. All that is needed 
then is to recognize that these other trans-generationally stable 
trait-forming causes meet the heritabilityX requirement for 
Darwinian evolution just as genes do. They all fulfill the causal 
role of being reliably present in repeated generations, poised to 
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contribute to the building of the phenotype. They are thus 
heritable in the one sense that matters, the sense that enables 
evolution by natural selection.
In human beings, culture will be the major source of non-genetic 
inheritance (Acerbi & Mesoudi, 2015; Richerson & Boyd, 
2008). Factors such as how we raise our children, how we 
school them, what norms and values we teach, what habits and 
lifestyles we have, how and where we live, how and where we 
work, what societies we build, what political and legal systems 
we have, what technologies we use, what we eat, whether and 
how we exercise, all this and more is part of a large package of 
culture children in every generation are shaped by. These 
packages will be different across different parts of the globe, 
and different parts of the package will have different “time 
constants”, i.e. will change faster or more slowly than others. 
But all will to some extent contribute to the stability or similarity 
of the phenotypes related across generations by descent.
Non-genetic inheritance is also found in animals with little 
or no culture. First, persistent trait-forming causes belonging 
to the physical, geological or biological environment affect most 
animals just as they do humans. Second, so do reconstructed 
trait-forming causes like wombs and eggs, a population- or 
species-specific diet, social interaction with parents and con-
specifics, specific forms of housing, etc. Third, there are other, 
more particular non-genetic inheritance systems in animals 
that are described in detail in the work of geneticists Jablonka 
& Lamb (2005); Jablonka & Lamb (2007). The subject matter, 
particularly in humans, far transcends the current fashionability 
of “epigenetics” (here, narrowly understood as chemical and 
structural modifications of DNA).
Heritability, extended
An extended view of heritability also resolves a contradic-
tion inherent in popular notions that deny genetic determinism, 
while also finding nothing wrong with the standard biological 
concept of heritability based exclusively on genetic inheritance. 
The problem becomes evident in a phrase we used earlier to 
characterize heritabilityBio: “To say that a trait is heritableBio 
means that if it exists in parents, it can recur in offspring 
because they receive from their parents the genes that give rise 
to the trait.”
This mechanism of inheritance can only work as described 
if having the right genes more often than not causes the trait in 
question, regardless of the configuration of other, non-genetic 
trait-forming causes. In other words, it can only work with a lib-
eral measure of genetic determinism. When genetic determin-
ism is rejected, however, a “paradox” arises: how could trans- 
generationally similar genes “give rise to” trans-generationally 
similar traits without other trait-forming causes also being 
trans-generationally similar?
If genes do not have special deterministic or instructive pow-
ers, how could the mere presence of certain genes guarantee 
the formation of a certain trait, irrespective of the status of 
other, non-genetic co-determinants of the trait?
The answer is that it could not. Development is paradigmatically 
a matter of multiple causes interacting to create a phenotype. 
If only one type of cause (genes) were stable across generations, 
and all other causes were free to vary arbitrarily, there would 
be no way of making sure that offspring develop the same 
traits as their parents4. It is here that the interactionist challenge 
really bites!
As soon as this is accepted, the pieces fall into place: trait 
heritability in the evolutionarily relevant sense can only be 
achieved if all or most or many trait-forming causes are stable 
across generations - certainly not if only one kind of cause is stable. 
The rest is re-description: we call all trans-generationally sta-
ble trait-forming causes inherited, because that is what they are 
in the sense relevant to Darwinian evolution (Griffiths, 2001; 
Griffiths & Gray, 1994; Griffiths & Gray, 1997; Griffiths & 
Gray, 2001)5. And we call all trans-generationally stable traits 
heritable, because that is what they are in the sense that is 
relevant to Darwinian evolution. What we end up with is a view 
in which many or most traits are heritable, and many or most 
causes of traits are inherited, at least to some extent. In her 
book-length treatment of the nature-nurture question, philoso-
pher of science Evelyn Fox Keller (2010) summarizes this new 
view of heritability:
"…let us acknowledge that… almost all human traits are 
transmitted from one generation to the next … [and] let us 
also accept the fact that the mechanisms of transmission 
are very varied. They may be genetic, epigenetic, cultural, 
or even linguistic." (p. 80)
Heritability, development, evolution: a broader view
It can now be seen that both the behavioral genetic and the 
standard biological concept of heritability are based on the false 
view that only genes are inherited, or at least that it is only 
genetic inheritance that matters. That view does not reflect the 
reality of non-genetic, in particular cultural, inheritance. A 
deeper understanding of heritability, development, and evolution 
can only follow from an extended notion of heritability which 
has a principled causal basis in evolutionary theory.
To elaborate: first, the concept of heritabilityX deepens the 
understanding of heritability qua parent-offspring resemblance. 
Far from being a phenomenon with a narrow causal basis lim-
ited to genetic inheritance, it is actually supported by a broad 
range of causal mechanisms. Everything that contributes to 
the stability of traits across generations is part of an inheritance 
mechanism. If, for example, offspring reliably get their dietary 
4It follows that to equate “heritable” or “inherited” with “genetic” is to tacitly 
accept some form of genetic determinism, because it is granted to genes 
alone to ensure the development of the traits that are inherited.
5
”…we should define “inheritance” so that something is inherited just if 
it passes from generation to generation in such a way that evolution can 
act on its variant forms. Hence, every element of the developmental matrix 
which is reliably replicated in each generation and which plays a role in the 
production of the evolved life cycle of the organism counts as something 
which is inherited.” (Griffiths, 2001, p. 402)
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habits from their parents, then the underlying process of social 
learning is part of an inheritance mechanism, and diet becomes 
an inherited (and heritable) trait in the full, evolutionarily 
licensed, sense of the word.
Broadening the notion of heritability makes sense of funda-
mental observations about the world, in particular the human 
world: that a vast array of conditions and stimuli that impinge 
on us are present in every generation, from the obvious, such as 
sunlight and oxygen, to the more subtle, such as cultural norms 
of behavior. Although it is certainly impressive that the DNA 
molecule is faithfully copied from parents to offspring, it is not 
only genes that provide stable inputs to the developmental process, 
and DNA-grade fidelity of replication is required neither for 
trait heritability nor for biological or cultural evolution (Henrich 
et al., 2008; Lewis & Laland, 2012; Richerson & Boyd, 2008, 
p. 83 ff). Rather, there are gradients of similarity of inherited 
trait-forming causes that lead to gradients of similarity in 
inherited traits.
Second, if non-genetic inheritance leads to stable changes 
in the phenotype of a population, there is no reason to deny 
this process the status of evolution. One might object that the 
time frame of many non-genetic inheritance phenomena is much 
shorter than the millions of years traditionally associated with 
genetic evolution, and that this should militate against them 
being counted as truly evolutionary. However, we do not see 
this as a principled objection. For one thing, research in recent 
decades has shown many examples of genetically driven evolu-
tion occurring at time scales as small as months (Gibbs & Grant, 
1987; Herrel et al., 2008; Losos et al., 2006; Reznick et al., 
1997). Further, it would be unprincipled just to draw a line 
somewhere and sort all instances of phenotypic change into 
evolutionary and non-evolutionary based on an arbitrary length 
threshold.
To take an example: adult body height has increased in Western 
populations for over a century. On average, current West-
erners are over 10 centimeters taller than their ancestors 
150 years ago (Danubio & Sanna, 2008). The main reasons 
for this secular trend are thought to be improvements in diet and 
hygiene, while genetic effects are deemed unlikely (Silventoinen, 
2003). If this is correct, then, since diet and standards of hygiene 
are certainly (at least partly) culturally inherited, there is no 
reason not to view this increase in height as true evolutionary 
change6. 
Third, an extended notion of heritability connects with the nature 
of development in various ways. The most important connection 
has already been mentioned: it is the fact that rejecting 
genetic determinism actually implies the notion of heritabilityX. 
If genes alone cannot and do not determine traits, how could 
it ever be sufficient for a parental trait to be “rebuilt” in 
offspring to just inherit the “right” genes? It could not, and 
therefore non-genetic trait-forming causes must also be inherited 
from parents7. 
Traits are always the product of multiple, interacting causes, 
none of which is a priori more determinative of the outcome 
than any other. Heritable traits do not remain stable across gen-
erations because there is one special trait-forming cause that 
instructs the developmental process, but because a sufficient 
number of different trait-forming causes are inherited so that 
the process results in a stable phenotype. The principle “same 
input - same output” applies.
Finally, the view of evolution that emerges is one in which 
an interacting network of internal and external trait-forming 
causes envelops and permeates the developing organism, spanning 
the generations and leading to the reliable recurrence - the 
heritability - of traits, or to trait variation, depending on the 
stability or variability of the network components involved (see 
Figure 1).
Conclusions
The behavioral genetic concept of heritability - what we have 
called “heritabilityBG“ - has three major flaws: first, it does not 
track common expectations about biological heritability; sec-
ond, it lacks utility for human research since it does not identify 
specific causes of traits, is silent on the potential success of new 
therapeutic interventions, and has no bearing on the malleabil-
ity of traits. Third, what heritabilityBG shares with the common 
understanding of biological heritability (“heritabilityBio”) is 
the popular misconception that heritability is based exclusively 
on genetic inheritance. In other words, both versions confuse 
“heritable” with “genetic”. This is both theoretically and empiri-
cally false; considering the origin and causal role of heritabil-
ity in Darwin’s scheme of evolution by natural selection shows 
that, conceptually, any mechanism that guarantees that traits 
reliably recur across generations will fulfill the heritability 
requirement of evolution. In human beings, cultural inheritance 
is the most varied and important such mechanism, but others 
are possible, and many have in fact been described in various 
species of animal (Jablonka & Lamb, 2005). A number of 
fundamental observations about the stability of cultural and 
physical environments can be re-interpreted as phenomena of 
inheritance in the Darwinian sense. This leads to an extended 6Cultural modes of inheritance necessitate a re-conceptualization of 
Darwinian fitness. In standard evolutionary theory, traits are passed only from 
parents to offpsring. Cultural inheritance, however, cannot only be “vertical”, 
it can also be “diagonal” and “horizontal”. Consider the trait of sharing. 
Children will learn to share from their parents (vertical transmission), but 
also from siblings and peers (horizontal transmission within the offspring 
generation) and from teachers and other adults (diagonal transmission from 
non-parental members of the parent generation to offspring generation). 
This allows for traits to spread among the offspring generation independently 
of the reproductive success of parents.
7
“It is commonly argued that the presence of the right genes must be what 
explains evolved traits, because genes are the only things organisms inherit 
from their ancestors. But a principled definition of inheritance does not 
yield this result (Griffiths & Gray, 2001). Organisms inherit an extended 
range of resources that interact to reconstruct the organism’s life cycle.” 
(Stotz & Griffiths, 2001, p. 153)
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Figure 1. A modern view of heritability in humans (© 2017 by the authors).
causally defined concept of heritability, which we call “heritabili-
tyX“.
HeritabilityX incorporates the insight that most trait-forming 
causes - genetic and non-genetic - recur in every generation 
and are therefore heritable in the relevant sense, which is as 
trans-generational enablers of Darwinian evolution. Standard 
neo-Darwinism takes inheritance to be exclusively genetic and 
therefore implicitly requires a form of genetic determinism, 
typically the so called “information metaphor”, the idea that 
genes embody instructions or even a program to direct the for-
mation of traits. However, there was never any solid theoretical 
or empirical reason to believe in the information metaphor, 
as close scrutiny by philosophers of science has demonstrated 
(Godfrey-Smith, 1999; Godfrey-Smith, 2008; Griffiths, 2001; 
Griffiths & Gray, 1994; Johnston, 1987; Keller, 1995; 
Moss, 2004; Neumann-Held, 2006; Nijhout, 1990; Oyama, 1985; 
Sarkar, 1996; Šustar, 2007).
In a new, updated view of life, traits from the parental genera-
tion are successfully re-created in offspring because a sufficient 
number of parental trait-forming causes - genetic and non- 
genetic - are inherited and serve as “inputs” to offspring devel-
opment. Same or similar inputs tend to produce same or similar 
outputs.
This perspective does justice to the most fundamental observa-
tion about development: that it is paradigmatically a process of 
different kinds of causes interacting constantly to produce traits 
or phenotypes, and that, in general, these causes are all jointly 
necessary, but not by themselves sufficient, to generate a cer-
tain outcome. There is a “causal parity” (Griffiths & Knight, 
1998) of different developmental causes, with none of them 
playing an a priori more significant or more determinative 
role than any other.
The causal parity of genes and other developmental factors also 
implies that genes cannot constitute sufficient causal routes 
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to traits, let alone provide complete explanations of traits. 
Full-blown explanations will integrate various kinds of 
causes across different levels of organizational hierarchy, and 
across the divide between the internal and the external. The 
impossibly broad categories of nature vs. nurture that captured 
the imagination of our intellectual ancestors a century ago 
are no longer fit for the science of today.
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Summary
In this article, the authors argue for an extension of the concept of heritability. They make three main
points which I reconstruct as follows. First, they argue that the notion of heritability used in behavioral
genetic (heritability ), in spite of tracking causation, is problematic for a number of reasons. In fact,
among other things, it does not permit to locate genes causally involved in the production of a phenotype
preventing us from effectively being able to intervene on deleterious phenotypes. It also elicits the
erroneous interpretation that phenotypes with a high heritability are immutable. Furthermore, this notion,
the authors claim, does not correspond to the notion of heritability used in biology (heritability ) which
they define as the capacity for a trait to be genetically transmitted from one generation to the other.
Second, the authors claim that heritability  is also problematic because it focuses solely on genetic
transmission which is too restrictive. Finally, they propose to extend the concept of heritability within an
evolutionary framework to account for non-genetic inheritance (heritability ).
 
Assessment
Barring a few reservations, I am overall in agreement with the authors’ reasoning and arguments.
However, I believe that a few distinctions should be drawn and incorporated in the revision of the
manuscript or response, in order to help the authors position themselves in relation to the existing
literature and prevent them from being misunderstood.
The first important distinction I would like to draw is between  heritability and a heritability theoretical 
. In principle, obtaining the theoretical heritability of a trait is pretty straightforward. One just takesestimate
the ratio of genotypic variance to phenotypic variance. One problem, however, is that genotypic variance
cannot be measured directly. Instead, one must use an algorithm (e.g., apply a parent-offspring
regression, Falconer’s formula, or any of the methods based on genome-wide association studies
(GWAS)) to obtain an estimate of it. It is helpful when criticizing the usefulness of “heritability”, to know
whether a criticism is addressed to the method for estimating heritability or to the concept itself. If the
former, there is scope for improvement; if the latter, the prospects are much bleaker: a perfect estimate of
the theoretical value would be unhelpful. Of course, whether one can obtain an accurate estimate in a
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 the theoretical value would be unhelpful. Of course, whether one can obtain an accurate estimate in a
given context is an important question, but it should nevertheless be distinguished from a criticism of the
theoretical underpinnings of heritability itself.
Going back to the different claims made by the authors, when they mention that, following some of the
classical models used in behavioral genetics, the heritability values obtained are prey to different
confounding variables, this represents a criticism of the estimates (and the underlying methods to obtain
them), not the concept. I take it that some of the authors’ criticisms are directed at some estimates (in
particular those obtained from twin studies), while other criticisms are directed at the concept itself. It
would be welcome to see this spelled out.
Second, it would be useful to see the distinction between broad-sense and narrow-sense heritability
clearly drawn in the context of the article. This is a classical distinction used in the literature (Downes,
2017 ). When one says that the   for a phenotype are genetic, this can be understood in twocauses
different ways. They refer either to an ontogenic timescale or to a phylogenetic timescale. In the former
case, the effects of genes and of their interactions are taken into account for the production of the
phenotype—this corresponds to broad-sense heritability. In the latter case, only the additive component
of genotypic variance is taken into account—this corresponds to narrow-sense heritability since particular
gene-gene interactions (e.g., dominance, epistasis) are, in the long run, eliminated during sexual
reproduction.
Mirroring the two notions of heritability are two different scientific projects in the study of the interactions
between genes and the environment for the production of a phenotype. One project aims at
understanding these interactions during development (ontogenic timescale), while the second project
aims at understanding them in the context of evolution (phylogenic timescale). Narrow-sense heritability is
clearly relevant for the latter project, while the relevance of heritability (whether in the narrow or the broad
sense) for the former project is much less obvious. It would be useful that the authors tell us whether, in
their view, many of the criticisms they make apply to both narrow- and broad-sense heritability and to
clarify which of the two research projects I outlined they are targeting. It looks to me as if the authors’
distinction between heritability  and heritability  is, at least in part, captured by the
narrow/broad-sense heritability distinction, though not fully since they claim that heritability  is a notion
used vernacularly in biology (see Minor point 2 below).
Third, I think it is important to note, as the authors do, that the traditional methods for estimating heritability
have been devised while the support for genetic information was unknown. Why does it matter? Simply
because what is meant by “genetic” (or more accurately genotypic) in the context of a twin-study or more
generally in quantitative genetics, does not perfectly overlap with what is meant with the same word in
molecular biology (Griffiths & Stotz, 2013 ). The difference has important implications when one calls for
the extension of an idea in which the words “gene” or “genetic” are used (see for instance Lu & Bourrat,
2018  in the context of the extended evolutionary synthesis). A gene in quantitative genetics, or more
generally in evolutionary theory, is a substrate-neutral entity of which one physical realizer is a molecular
gene. “Genetic variance” in this context refers to anything physical that behaves like a molecular gene
including some epigenetic factors. Thus, I believe that the extension the authors call for is, for part,
already accounted for by the classical conceptual apparatus. Two things should be noted, however:
Estimation methods of heritability relying on genomic data (e.g., Visscher, Yang, & Goddard, 2010
) refer to a very narrow notion of the gene, namely one in which a gene is a given DNA-sequence
variant with at least one non-silent substitution. Other types of mutations, such as additions and
deletions, as well as other DNA changes such as chromosomic changes are not accounted for by
these methods (Bourrat, accepted ) and they are one of the reasons a large discrepancy exists
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these methods (Bourrat, accepted ) and they are one of the reasons a large discrepancy exists
between traditional methods of estimation and those based on GWAS (Bourrat & Lu, 2017 ;
Danchin, 2013 ). All these “genetic” differences are relevant evolutionarily and should be included
for obtaining an accurate estimate of heritability relevant for evolution. In this respect a call for
extending heritability (estimates) to non-genetic factors (where “non-genetic” here is in reference to
the   concept of the gene) is justified.molecular
 
 Non-genetic factors (where “non-genetic” here is in reference to the   concept of theevolutionary
gene) can be transmitted over time. This calls for a substrate neutral concept of heritability, which
can be defined abstractly as a relative population-level measure of parent-offspring resemblance.
When defined as such, no particular mechanism of inheritance is considered. Although this notion
of heritability is sometimes preferred by some (see for instance the exchange between Downes,
2009  and Okasha, 2010 ) because it is even more abstract than the gene-centered concept, it
can lead to a number of epistemic difficulties, such as for instance assessing the causal structure
underlying the inheritance of different factors from one generation to the other. For instance, as
shown by Lynch and Bourrat (2017) , when there exists a genotype-environment correlation, the
causal origin of the correlation can be different. One implication of this difference is that in cases
where the environment can be considered as part of the extended phenotype of a genotype, one
should include any gene-environment correlation resulting from this causal relationship as part of
the heritability estimate. On the contrary, when environment and genotype are causally
independent, the correlation should not be included in the estimate. One danger of calling for an
extension of the heritability concept to diverse types of physical substrates is to neglect that many
of them might be extended phenotypes. Thus, calling for an extension of the concept of heritability
to include non-genetic factors (including environmental ones) can be wrongheaded in some
situations. To be clear, I am not defending here a naïve version of genetic determinism, just
hedging against a strong version of the causal parity thesis.[1] For these reasons, I found the
Figure 1 slightly misleading as each factor is represented by a line which does not cross with any
other. This tends to suggest that these factors are independent from one another. In reality, many
of these factors interact (non-additively) with one another, and some will be causally involved in the
determination of other transmitted factors. I think it would be useful to visually represent this on the
figure or write it somewhere in the caption and/or text. Additionally, if heritability is invoked with the
aim of separating the effects of individual properties from those of the environment in their
contribution to parent-offspring phenotypic resemblance, it must be defined in reference to an
environment even when the abstract substrate-neutral concept is used. This implies that the
environment (or at least part of it) must be considered independently from the properties of the
individuals forming a population. Calling for an extension of heritability to include the environment
(or part of it), without being very clear what is meant by the word “environment” could lead to the
view that any factors of the environment correlated with individual properties should be included in
a heritability measure. This should be resisted. This last point is to be related to the problematic
use of the notion recurrence by the authors when they refer to heritability. Recurrence does not
necessarily imply transmission, while a trait being heritable implies that it has been transmitted. I
am not saying that the authors have fallen prey to the different problems outlined above with
respect to extending the concept of heritability. Rather, I am saying that while an extension of the
notion of heritability is welcome, the authors might want to ponder upon this type of considerations
to guard themselves against these potential difficulties. 
More minor points:
I think I agree with Eric Turkheimer (Reviewer 1) that the authors might focus too narrowly on
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5.  
I think I agree with Eric Turkheimer (Reviewer 1) that the authors might focus too narrowly on
behavioral genetics. I also recommend using the term “heritability ” instead of “heritability ”.
 
I was unconvinced by the claim on page 6 that bipedality is universally considered has heritable
while its heritability  is nil. Most evolutionary biologists would say that bipedality has a low
heritability but would recognize that the   of this trait is high. I am thus wondering whetherheredity
the authors’ intention is not contrast   with a population measure of it, namely heredity heritability,
the latter of which is a very imperfect measure of the former.
 
Related to the previous point, I would argue that the word heritability is most often used in a
technical sense while the words inheritance and heredity are used more casually. In their proposal
of extending heritability to non-genetic factors, do the authors have in mind a technical or
vernacular notion? Since they used “heritability”, and they want their extension to be framed
evolutionarily, I took it they had in mind a technical notion. In fact, in evolutionary biology heritability
overwhelmingly refers to the technical meaning of quantitative genetics. But if they don’t then they
should be very clear about it since this could be an important way in which their article is
misunderstood.
 
I would cite Lewontin (1970)  when mentioning the three conditions for evolution by natural
selection since this paper was very influential in making the recipe approach to natural selection a
popular one in the last 50 years.
 
I think the authors should recognize previous calls to extend the concept of heritability. One such
call in evolutionary theory has been made by Danchin (2013) .
[1] Note furthermore that another reason it is not a defense of naïve determinism is that this reasoning
could be applied whether genes or any other inherited factors is transmitted from parent to offspring.
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This article reframes the concept of heritability in a developmentalist and evolutionary framework.
Although the article makes several interesting points and advances the discussion of the heritability of
behavior, I think it could be improved in two complementary ways: better attention to the past, and better
attention to the future.
Starting with the latter, my strongest point on the level of peer review is that the decision to limit the BG
portion of the article to twin studies is a serious limitation on its overall relevance. Twin studies are getting
rarer and rarer, as they are replaced by GWAS and related methods that are based on measured DNA
obtained from samples of unrelated participants. These new methods have changed the field in many
profound ways. They have, for example, reduced most estimated heritabilities considerably. They have
changed the way analysis of variance is used to compute heritability, and in some ways found ways to
estimate heritability without analysis of variance (e.g. polygenic risk scores). They have also changed the
way we think about questions of the relation between ANOVA and causation, as we are now able to at
least consider the causal properties of some DNA-based effects on behavior.
I do not mean to say that modern genomics refutes the argument that is presented here. In some ways it
supports it, but in general it complicates the picture, and this paper would be much more relevant to the
current state of affairs if it grappled with the field as it is now rather than what it was like 20 years ago, in
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current state of affairs if it grappled with the field as it is now rather than what it was like 20 years ago, in
the heyday of big twin studies and Richard Lewontin.
Even as a reflection of older models of behavior genetics, the limitation of heritability to twin studies is
problematic. It omits, for example, adoption studies, which are in many ways more directly related to
issues of parent-child transmission that interest these authors. Even more generally, twin and adoption
studies are actually special cases of a larger paradigm called quantitative genetics, which involves
estimating variance components from analysis of familial relationships, which includes twins and
adoptees but potentially many other relations as well. More complicated quantitative genetic models
incorporate much more sophisticated results than the simple ACE or AE models the authors present here.
Again, I don’t necessarily think consideration of such models would invalidate the authors’ arguments, but
as it stands they run the risk of being accused of arguing with a very dated straw man.
My final point along these lines is that I don’t really think it is correct to characterize what this model of
heritability as heritabilityBG. Quantitative genetics as applied to humans doesn’t actually have anything to
do with behavior per se, and as the authors demonstrate the methods can be applied just as easily to
height. There is a very large domain of twin studies of medical conditions. The authors are correct that the
deep issues are about variance and causation, not behavior per se. I would call it heritability QG.
As for the inclusion of the past, there are several places along the way that the authors don’t recognize
previous versions of very similar discussions. It’s not a matter of citing this or that study, it is a question of
recognizing that this discussion has been going on for a very long time. I will include those issues as I
proceed to enumerate more specific concerns below.
The discussion of cytoplasmic effects, while potentially interesting, is introduced without evidence
that it is actually relevant to analyses of human behavior. It is also an instance of a broader issue
- the equal environments assumption - that has a very long history in the theory of twin studies. 
 
The discussion of anova and causation is incomplete. The classic article on the subject, Lewontin’s
Analysis of Variance and Analysis of Causes, is mentioned but not considered in any detail. Much
of what is said here is a recapitulation of that article. The authors might also want to look at the
critiques of behavior genetics made by the developmental biologist Gilbert Gottlieb in the nineties,
along with replies from myself and Irving Gottesman.
 
I’m not sure I see the point of the first full paragraph in the right column of Page 5. If a correlational
study of food intake is sufficient to establish causal effects of dietary intake on BMI, why wouldn’t
an adoption study showing that BMI of adopted away children is correlated with that of their
biological parents (or a polygenic score computed from their genome) do the same for genes?
 
It seems to me that two issues are being conflated here. The first is Lewontin’s concern with
variation and cause. Down’s syndrome is a cause of reduced IQ, but it is not a source of important
IQ variance in the population. The other is correlation and causation. Observing that environmental
or genetic variables are correlated with BMI is not the same as showing that they cause BMI
because of all the complex developmental issues the authors discuss.
 
The statement, “It leaves us entirely in the dark as to which specific genes are involved in the
formation of that trait (Sober, 2001)” is no longer true in the DNA era. We are hardly enlightened
about such things nowadays, but we are not as in the dark as we used to be.
 
In the discussion of both variance and causation, and heritability and malleability, the authors might
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 6.  In the discussion of both variance and causation, and heritability and malleability, the authors might
want to have a look at recent philosophical work on causation, focusing on the idea of actual and
potential difference makers. Heritability is about actual difference makers; malleability is about
potential difference makers. These issues also come up in the Turkheimer and Gottesman
responses to Gottlieb.
That brings me to heritabilityX and the authors conclusion, so I will stop numbering and consider the
conclusion broadly. I don’t object in principle to their characterization of heritability as arising from causal
consistency of any kind across generations. My objection to such developmentalist views are more
practical than principled. It seems to me that they encourage a view of development that says all cats are
gray in the dark, whereas in fact we can make real distinctions about cats, at least out on the edges of the
forest where a little light gets in. Whether those principles apply to more complex problems deeper in the
dark forest of human behavior is another question, but I don’t think it helps to ignore the distinctions that
can be made.
So start with single gene disorders. Huntington’s disease is transmitted across generations because the
gene is transmitted, and because the environment that supports the expression of the gene (which, as far
as we know, is all environments) is also transmitted. We wouldn’t want to conclude, however, that
distinctions between genetic and environmental transmission of HD are pointless, because we
understand how it works. It could in principle turn out that there is an environmental treatment for HD, and
if that happens the story will change, but for the time being it is meaningful to talk about HD as genetic.
The case for PKU is more complex because there is a therapeutic environment. But it still doesn’t create a
major problem, once again because we generally understand the mechanism. In fact, no one actually
bothers to compute the heritability of PKU, because in the presence of biological understanding it is pretty
much irrelevant: the etiology of PKU is what it is, regardless of how various components of that etiology
happen to vary at a particular time and place.
Now do height. Why is height transmitted across generations? OK, it is because both genetic and
environmental causes of height are preserved. But if you are taller than me, and we are both well-fed
modern Americans, we are willing to presume that the cause of that difference is genetic, on the
reasonable assumption that relevant environmental causes are not operating. If we observe that
Americans are taller now than they were in 1900 we conclude the opposite, because we presume that
relevant genetic causes are not operating. On this planet, we don’t have to conclude that no distinctions
can be made between genetic and environmental transmission of height.
But for IQ, it is more problematic. We know that there are both genetic and environmental causes, and
that both of them operate among individuals in the contemporary world. In addition we know that these
causes are correlated (rGE would be a useful concept throughout) and that they interact (so would GxE).
If you are smarter than me, is that because of genetic or environmental difference between us, or some
complex combination of the two? We have no mechanistic knowledge, and no reasonable way of finding
out, so the problem becomes intractable. Polygenic human behavior is by and large a gray cat.
My conclusion from all this is that the deep problem in understanding the heritability of human behavior is
more practical than theoretical. The problem is not so much with the notion of heritability that is applied,
but more with the limitations of our knowledge about how G and E work together to produce human
behavioral phenotypes. I think this article does an excellent (albeit, as I have said, somewhat incomplete)
job of laying out these issues, even if I don’t fully agree with their conclusion.
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